THE
HOMO SAPIENS AND THE
“HOUSE”
OF ITS
BE-ING
IN THE WORLD
Atty. Mark Gil J.
Ramolete, MA Philos
INTRODUCTION
It is not the aim of this paper to
conceive and then to gestate a crystallize definition of language using two
famous European philosophers. The
primary aim of this paper is simply to provide a mere description of language
through a thematic review on Heidegger and Wittgenstein concerning their
respective philosophical projects on language.
In an attempt to describe language, it is important to note that
language should not be forced to succumb to our linguistic currency in order to
satisfy our demand for clarity and certainty.
To
begin with the embryonic stage of our discussion, it is quite important to bear
in mind that the species Homo sapiens are the only species that have evolved
with an advanced system of communication.
Humans have developed linguistic currencies that can express a variety
of separate and distinct thoughts. This
marvelous evolutionary leap is what distinguished the human specie from all
other species existing in the cosmos.
Starting
from the pre-Socratic philosophers up to the present milieu, philosophy as a
lifestyle or a mode of being and as a field of study has been overwhelmingly
pervaded with an atmosphere of passion and desire to search for meaning, not
just simply meaning but aesthetic meaning of one’s existence and its
relatedness to the perceived and experienced reality. The human person’s craving for meaning is
what gave birth to philosophy. However,
philosophy would not be possible if it is not being immersed into the vast and
dynamic realm of language. The “dasein”
or the existent subject together with other beings come into the realm of
language to be, the same through with philosophy as a way of life and as a
field of concern.
Reality
as the source of meaning is always pillared through language. Language serves as the matrix through which
reality is constituted, pictured and interpreted. Reality then becomes sensible, logical and
intelligible because of language.
However, this view is not sufficient enough to say that meaning is
sensible. There is a need to expand the
said view by saying that meaning is sensible, logical and intelligible because
of language as something social, contextual, practical and rule-governed. Claiming language as such shall lead us to
the existential character of the “dasein” as “thrown” in the cosmos serving as
the provenance of light where being comes to be.
In
order that my thematic discussion on Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein
concerning language shall yield a crystallize understanding, I would like to
suggest that we should not simply interpret and confine our knowledge on
language as simply grammar, as mere utterance of a living organism, as mere
thought formulated in terms of symbolic character or in terms of the character
of signification, but also as the clearing-concealing field where being comes
to be and not comes to be.
Ludwig
Wittgenstein[1]
on language: the existential approach
Our language can be seen as an ancient city:
a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new, and of houses with
additions from various periods; and this surrounded by multitude of new
boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.[2] This symbolical approach to language
provided for by Wittgenstein reiterates the fact that language is a sedimentation
of various modalities of life from various eras. As time changes, different forms or life
mirroring the sentiments, feelings, needs and customary habits of a particular
milieu are also constituted. It would
be an illusion to speak of a one to one correspondence between a word and the
object through which this word stands for because language is never kept
unchanged within the course of time. To
crystallize the point I am driving at, let us take the case of the word
“family” as our example. In the past,
when people hear the word family, what immediately materializes in the mind
with clarity and certainty is the orthodox notion of a family that a family is
a basic social institution composing of a father, mother and child. However, with the advent of the postmodern
era, the orthodox notion of a family has been completely revolutionized to
incorporate what we call now in our current milieu, the alternative form of
family composing either of both man or both woman and the child. To use now the word family in our present
context, one has to be clear with the self what paradigm of family is being
used to avoid linguistic misunderstanding or confusion. With the given example, we can say that
through the journey of time, language is never immortalized. This nonimmortalization of language is
supported by Wittgenstein by arguing that “language__I want to say is a
refinement.”[3] Thus, there is no such thing as an absolute
and universal linguistic currency within the mind of the speaking and thinking
subject.
It
is but an inescapable fact that language is indeed a sedimentation of
diversified modalities of life or forms of life from various eras. To further substantiate the said claim,
Wittgenstein argues that “to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life,”
(PI 18, p. 8). The form of life that
Wittgenstein is trying to drive at refers to “a culture or social formation and
the totality of communal activities or practices.”[4] To create now a mental picture of language,
one should be able to recognize and to ascertain the culture at work. Conceptualizing and understanding language
would necessitate the need to take a look and comprehend the customary
activities and practices that are socially fashioned and established. The situatedness of language through
different and distinct forms of life reflects the dynamism of meaning. Meaning always changes and differs from one
situation to another situation or from one context to another context. Language as rooted in a particular juncture
of time and in a particular juncture of place and manifested through the
existing modality of life constitutes the matrix where the dynamic unfolding of
meaning takes place. To concretize the
point I am driving at, let us take the case of greeting a person “good morning”
as our example. Let us say for example
I went to a department store to shop.
Upon entering the store, I saw you together with a lady friend of yours. That lady friend of yours is a French
national. You greeted me and said,
“naimbag nga bigat mo” and I also greeted you by saying, “naimbag met nga bigat
mo.” After you greeted me, you
introduced me to your companion. After
you introduced me to your friend, I also greeted your friend by saying,
“naimbag nga bigat mo adding.” You interrupted then by saying to your
companion, “my friend here said bonjour
mademoiselle.” After a few minutes
communicating with each other, we eventually said goodbye. From the given example, it has been clearly
pointed out that language and the meaning that language generates is always
rooted in a context. This
contextualization of language and at the same time meaning has been given
emphasis by Wittgenstein. He writes:
What is happening now has
significance___in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance,
(PI 583, p. 153).
The existence of various and diversified modalities of life
in a given specified
milieu ensures the dynamic instead of a static constitution of meaning, thus,
Wittgenstein further writes:
“So you are saying that
human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”___It is what human
beings say is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in
form of life, (PI 241, p. 88).
If language is to be a means
of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also
(queer as this may sound) in judgments, (PI 242, p. 88).
The creation of meaning through a cooperative and communal
enterprise asserts the fact that language is by nature social or communal. The meaning of a word or an action is agreed
upon by a group of people or a culture in a particular spatio-temporal context
where constellation of meaning is embedded.
Furthermore, the cosmos is a composite of diversified cultures and
races, and as long as this character of the cosmos remains unchanged, reality
is and will always be a constellation of meaning. In order that there will be a unity in
diversity in the cosmos arising from these diversified cultures and races as
the womb of constellated meaning, the meaning of a word or an act must be
agreed upon through convention for the sensibility and comprehensibility of
such meaning. Wittgenstein, in this
case, emphasizes the point that there is no such thing as a private language
but public language. This public
character of language opens up possibilities for a fruitful dialogue not just
with the self, but also within the whole range of the others. We can never extract language from a
socio-cultural context whenever we want to legitimate the meaning of a
word. Language never ceases itself to
be with a background because it is through with a background that language
makes a meaning sensible, comprehensible and intelligible. In order to maintain the integrity of a
meaning arising from a context, it must be maintained and preserved through its
union with the same contextual background.
Furthermore,
aside from being social and communal, “language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments,” (PI 569, p.
151). Through certain concepts provided
for by language, it is made possible to engage ourselves in a sort of
hermeneutical contact with reality.
Through the use of concepts, we allow reality to speak to us as a
linguistic phenomenon. Concepts are
indeed indispensable content of our linguistic currency because “concepts lead
us to make investigations; are the expressions of our interest and direct our
interest,” (PI 570, p. 151). Thus, we
say then that language is our medium to reality. Language gives us a glimpse of reality. Language bridges us to reality. How is it possible then for language to
create a bridge between us and reality?
Wittgenstein writes:
A proposition is a picture
of reality. A proposition is a model of
reality as we imagine it.[5]
Through
the mirroring power of language, the possibility of creating a bridge between
us and reality is made to materialize.
As a sign of respect to Wittgenstein, it is quite significant to give a
cautious and sensitive notice on the word “model” that he used in his
argument. Speaking of model,
Wittgenstein is not trying to pursue here the claim that language leads us to
see reality as it is. Using the word
model should give us a hint that language provides us a portrait, a sketch or a
paradigm to comprehend and visualize reality as it appears to us. Thus, Wittgenstein reiterates that “we must
do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place,” (PI
109, p. 47).
The view of picturing reality
through language must not be misconstrued as an attempt to define but to
demonstrate reality as portrayable. Any
attempt to define reality shall only hinder and suppress the dynamic unfolding
and evolution of meaning from various nodes and modalities of human linguistic
currency. To drive the discussion
further, speaking now of language as an instrument, language and the meaning it
generates should not be simply limited from its mere surrounding. Considering language as an instrument
necessitates also the need to consider the practicality of a word vis-à-vis to its
contextual background. Wittgenstein
reiterates then that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language,” (PI
43, p. 20). Now here is an example to
ponder with. Let us say for example
that while I am sharpening my pencil inside my room, you knocked at the door of
my room and said, “can I borrow your pencil sharpener?” Answering you back, I said, “you wait for a
moment until I am done sharpening my pencil.”
After a few minutes, I came to your room and handed you a kitchen
knife. Upon seeing the kitchen knife,
you reacted by saying, “I did not ask you a kitchen knife but a pencil
sharpener!” I answered back by saying,
“this knife that I am holding is the pencil sharpener that I was using when you
asked me to borrow my pencil sharpener!”
Since you badly needed to sharpen your pencil and I also do not have a
real pencil sharpener intended for pencils, you took the kitchen knife from me
and you started sharpening your pencil.
From the given example, two different meanings were at work between the
two actors involved. Two different
meanings were conceived arising from two different situation or context. Furthermore, from the previously given
example, I interpreted that you wanted to use the same kitchen knife to sharpen
your pencil because during that time that you asked me to borrow my pencil
sharpener, I was using the said kitchen knife to sharpen my pencil. Thus, to discern and comprehend the meaning
of a word, there is a need to free our thoughts from the illusionary belief
that the object through which a word stands for is the sole matrix and fountain
of meaning for that word. In unveiling
and disclosing the real meaning of a used word, it requires a certain degree of
sensitivity on the practical use of a word from its contextual background.
Different variety of meaning
arises because of the presence of different variety of language. There are different varieties of language in
our linguistic economy because there are different forms and modalities of life
that serves as the matrix of a variety of different “language-games.” Speaking of language-game, Wittgenstein
writes:
I shall call the whole, consisting language and the actions
into which it is woven, the
“language-game,” (PI 7, p. 5).
Engaging ourselves with language
presupposes a kind of activity, that is, a rule governed activity that can
create intimate connections. With the
creation of intimate connections, we are enabled to perceive and recognize
certain degree of similitude and interconnectedness in our belongingness with
the whole range of the others.
Wittgenstein writes:
Instead of producing
something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena
have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,___but
they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or
these relationships, that we call them all “language,” (PI 65, p. 31).
Language
is like those games that we play that once we are consummated or mesmerized by
the game, we continue playing the game harmoniously with the other
players. Having experienced once to
play the game could give us a first hand and immediate encounter on the basic
rules of the game. The second time
around that we play the game, we already have in mind a meaningful view on how
to start and eventually inter-subjectively immersed the self in the game. However, the possibility for tension and
discord to arise is still inevitable despite the nature of language as a rule
governed activity. Any breach in
linguistic currency could be the possible result of an inadequate response to
the established rules of the game or it can also be that the rules have already
become insufficient to represent the modality of life existing through the
progress of time. Thus, the need for
refinement. Despite the nature of
language as the product of agreement to ensure meaningful communication,
language never remains to be static.
Wittgenstein writes:
We are struggling with
language. We are engaged in a struggle
with language, (CAV, p. 11).
Our language-games should always
be receptive to the possibility of change for a meaningful encounter with
reality. Despite the recognition we
have given to language as a contextual rule-governed activity, rules on the use
of language need not be that absolute, universal and necessary to allow the
dynamism of reality to unfold. The
dynamism of reality should not be constrained to unfold through the use of
certain logical or mathematical formulas to prove the validity of certain facts
in reality.
Martin Heidegger[6] on
language: the ontological approach
When we speak of language, are we
simply referring here to mere speech or to those different forms of expressions
we use? Is language a phenomenon that
belongs to the human person in as much as it is only the human person who is
capable of rigid and methodical thinking?
Is language a treasure possessed by the human person to constitute
his/her being or is it language that possessed the historical subject? Heidegger in his Letter on Humanism provides us an answer to these questions that we
have posted. Heidegger writes:
In
its essence, language is not the utterance of an organism nor is it the
expression of a living thing. Nor can
it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic
character of signification.[7]
The
given assertion of Heidegger on language enunciates two significant points
about what language is not. These two
germane points are as follows: (1) that
language is not about the logical and methodical construction of statements,
propositions or arguments, and (2) that language is not about human speech and
expressions used to expediate communication between and among historical
subjects.
To
start with our discussion, logic always involves the use of statements,
propositions or arguments. These
statements, propositions or arguments are all constituted by words or by
conceptual frameworks. Since in logic,
we are dealing with words or concepts, then are we not also engaging ourselves
with language? As what we have said
previously, language is not about the logical and methodical construction of
statements, propositions or arguments.
With this assertion that we have on language, you might now be asking,
what are we driving at when we speak of language? What is wrong if we claim otherwise that
language is the logical and methodical construction of statements, propositions
or arguments? Heidegger responds to
these questions, he writes:
That the essence of
propositional truth consists in the correctness of statements is thought to
need no further special proof.[8]
What
does Heidegger driving at with the above given assertion? Before we answer this question, let us try
to discuss first what we are trying to convey when we use the term logic. Logic is occasionally defined as the
philosophic science that evaluates arguments and inferences to distinguish
correct from incorrect reasoning. With
this definition of logic, we can say that an argument is considered logically
sound and valid when the conclusion is equal to or lesser than the given
premises but not greater nor stronger because we cannot derive more than the
source. Furthermore, in order to trace
the validity of an argument, one ought to examine critically the truthfulness
or falsity of the given propositions or statements that constitute an
argument. Thus, we say then that one
cannot derive a false conclusion if the given premises are both true;
otherwise, the argument is invalid.
From this discussion that we have on logic, we have encountered the
notion of a propositional truth. But
what do we mean with propositional truth?
Heidegger writes:
Propositional truth is
possible only on the basis of material truth, of adequatio rei ad intellectum [adequation of thing to intellect],
(OET, p. 138).
To
concretize the assertion given by Heidegger, let us try to consider this
example: If God is subjected to time and space, then God is imperfect because
God is prone to change and error. God
is not imperfect because God is not prone to change and error. Therefore, God is not subjected to time and
space. From this given example, we have
established a certain notion about God, that is, by making God succumb to our
rigid and methodical construction of a sound argument. In our desire to know God, we have made God
succumb to our conceptual categories.
However, the undeniable truth still prevails that God is beyond any
linguistic phenomena. Thus, language
cannot be equal to logical truth because language will only be conferred to the
easy disposal of the human subject. The
problem with material truth as the basis of propositional truth is that
“material truth always signifies the consonance of something at hand with the
‘rational’ concept of its essence,” (OET, p. 139). If language is equated to logical truth, the
unveiling of the truth of anything that there is or is about to come or is
present in any modality of presencing shall only be reduced to a subject
centered fishing exhibition through the imposition of certain “categories of
the mind.” The authentic notion of
truth has its origin in language and neither on logical truth nor material
truth because as Heidegger writes:
Truth is not a feature of
correct propositions that are asserted of an “object” by a human “subject” and
then “are valid” somewhere, in what sphere we know not; rather, truth is
disclosure of beings through which openness essentially unfolds, (OET, p. 146).
The
unveilment of truth about any being is not a subject centered enterprise. The unveilment of truth about any being
takes place within the domain or realm of language where the human person
serves as the medium where the process of becoming is ensured. Language therefore is not about the logical
and methodical construction of statements.
This assertion that we have on language seeks to show us that language
is the domain where the disclosure of something that there is or is about to
come or is present in any form of presencing unfolds in its concealedness or
unconcealdness or even both.
To
drive further our discussion, we have asserted earlier that language is not
also about human speech and expressions used to facilitate communication
between and among historical subjects.
In order to convince us on the second claim that we have made on
language in the form of a negation, Heidegger writes:
Language thereby falls into
the service of expediating communication along routes where
objectification____the uniform accessibility of everything to
everyone____branches out and disregards all limits. In this way, language comes under the
dictatorship of the public realm which decides in advance what is intelligible
and what must be rejected intelligible, (LOH, p. 242).
The
assertion made by Heidegger is intended to convince us that if we claim the
contrary that language is about human speech and expressions used to expediate
communication between and among historically discerning subjects, such claim
will only immerse language into the totalitarian, autocratic and arbitrary grip
of the human subject. Furthermore, if
we have made the contrary claim, such assertion on language will deny us its
profound and vivid essence as “the house of the truth of being,” (LOH, p. 243). In order to have a fruitful and meaningful
encounter with anything that there is or is about to come or is present in any
modality of presencing, it is a must for us as historically discerning subjects
not to allow language to “surrender to our mere willing and trafficking as an
instrument of domination over being, (LOH, p. 243). Now, let us take this an example to
substantiate our discussion. Let us say
that I am holding with my right hand a metallic object. I then ask you, “is this metallic object a
true ball pen?” Using your sense of
sight, you replied and said, “that is indeed a ball pen!” You have made such remark because the
metallic object unmistakably resembles a ball pen. However, after I have opened the metallic
object, you have noticed that it is not an authentic ball pen, but rather a
bladed object that resembles a knife.
From this example that we have, sometimes if not all the times, we have
the unrestricted drive to impose our humanly pre-fabricated a priori concepts
to any being that we encounter in our midst in order to provide us a logical
approach to our socially constituted reality.
Thus, we say then that “man acts as though he were the shaper and master
of language, while in fact language remains the master of man.”[9] It is our customary notion that we are the
shapers and masters of language because we possess both the faculty to think
and the faculty to speak. However, the
possessions of these faculties are not sufficient guarantee for us to say that
we are the shapers and masters of language.
We are neither the shapers nor masters of language because we are just
simply responding to that which is or is present in any modality of presencing
to disclose or to unveil it in a linguistic form. Heidegger writes:
We are capable of thinking
only in so far as we are endowed with what is most thought-provoking, gifted
with what ever and always want to be thought about.[10]
Language
and being are reciprocally connected with each other. Language and being are intimately connected
with each other through a kind of nuptial or mutual relation because “language
is the house of being,” (LOH, p.239).
To confer then language at the autocratic and arbitrary grip of the
historically discerning subject will only sever the reciprocal relation between
language and being. Having recognized
this reciprocal relation between language and being, let us now try also to
unveil the connection of thinking to language and at the same time the
connection of thinking to being. To
begin with our discussion, we say in a Heideggerian perspective that we are
thinking not because we possess the faculty to think, but we are rather
thinking because that which is or is about to come or is present in some way in
any modality of presencing is calling through its animating voice that faculty
of ours to think. To make the point we
are driving at clearer, let us try to consider this example: Let us say that as
a friend of mine, you have helped me overcome my suicidal tendency and my sense
of hopelessness with life through a fruitful guidance counseling session. I then told you, “gayem, addaan ka iti
nasinaw a panagpuspuso. Agyamannak iti
saan to pulos a mabayadan a tulong mo nga nangipamatmat ken nangiparikna
kanniak ti pudno a kaipapanan iti biag.”
I was able to utter those statements directed to you because you have
with you that being that has animated my own being to instigate my own faculty
of thinking to respond to that calling of your being in you to be thought in
its essential nature through a linguistic form. I may have uttered those words to embody in
a linguistic form that which has invigorated me to think; nonetheless, I cannot
yet say conclusively and with absolute certainty that I have already embodied
in a linguistic form the totality of the speaking of that being that has called
me to speak because as Heidegger writes:
That which calls on us to
think and appeals to us to think, claims thought for itself and as its own,
because by itself it gives food for
thought____not just occasionally but now and always. What so gives food for thought is what we
call most though-provoking. Nor does it
give only what always remains to be thought about; it gives food for thought in
much wider-reaching and decisive sense that it first entrusts thought and
thinking to us as what determines our nature, (WCT, p. 125).
Whenever
we think, we always rely on the sheltering of language. We are thinking that which is or is about to
come or is present in any modality of presencing because language provide us
the abode or the dwelling place to think.
We have this assertion regarding thinking in order not to lost sight of
our constantly repeated claim that language is the abode of being. With language as the abode of being, “what
calls on us to think, demands for itself that it be tended, cared for,
husbanded in its own essential nature, by though,” (WCT, p. 121). Thinking as coming into the vast realm of
language shows the experiential and existential essence of the human person as
the provenance of light in the cosmos in order that something may come to
be. Thinking as coming into the abode
of being radiates the ingenious light of the human person as the receptacle for
the letting be of beings in the cosmos.
Heidegger further elaborates to us the letting be of beings through the
guidance of the ingenious light possessed by the human person, he writes:
The
human being is the shepherd of beings, (LOH, p. 252).
It
is quite clear from the above given assertion by Heidegger that the human
person is not the creator of beings but simply the shepherd of beings. The human person who appropriates meaning in
the cosmos should be like a teacher who do not impose nor coerce his/her
students to learn, but simply guides his/her students to become through proper
thought and training. Seeing the human
person as the historically discerning subject is to consider the human person
as the unfolding of a life course in the cosmos in order that something comes
to be. However, despite the ingenious
light possessed by the historically discerning subject as the provenance of
light in the cosmos, there is still the possibility for being not to be
disclosed and unveiled. Heidegger
writes:
Language
is the clearing-concealing advent of being itself, (LOH, p. 249).
Language here is seen as the field
where being comes to be and not comes to be.
Language is the necessary condition in order that being comes to be in
its actual sense. The unveiling of
being happens through language because it is through the vast and rich realm of
language that being is explicitated or actualized through a fruitful dialogue
and encounter with reality. On the
other hand, being has the tendency to conceal itself into the vast and rich
realm of language because of the dynamism of reality and because of the
possible result of an unfruitful dialogue with the dynamic and immensely rich
reality. This clearing-concealing
advent of being itself through the rich realm of language is being explained
further by Heidegger through what he calls “telling:”
Telling
is the business of language, (WCT, p. 206).
If telling is the business of
language, what does language tell?
According to Martin Heidegger, what language tells, what it speaks and
what it keeps silent, is and remains always and everywhere what is, what can
be, what has been, and what is about to come____most directly and abundantly
where the term “is” and “be” are not specifically given voice. The telling here as the business of language
is part and parcel of thinking. The
clearing of the truth of being according to Heidegger happens in thinking, in
thinking whose prime nature is being linguistic as the engagement by and for
the truth of being. Engagement by being
for being according to Heidegger is a way of embracing a “thing” or a “person”
in their essence through a fruitful dialogue and encounter. To embrace a “thing” or a “person” in their
essence means to love them, to understand them, to favor them, (LOT, p.
241). Such an act of embrace, though
sometimes difficult to do because of the historically discerning subject’s
tendency to become subjectivist, is in the proper essence of enabling. This act of embracing does not only seek to
achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its
provenance like a newly blossomed flower, that is let it be. Thus, it is only appropriate to say that we
should not speak for someone but let that someone speak for
himself/herself. An engagement with
being happens in thinking through telling which requires time for listening to
yield a fruitful dialogue or encounter.
Furthermore, through what Heidegger
calls “ek-sistence,” the historically discerning subject shepherds being into
becoming. By shepherding being to
becoming, we constitute not only the meaning of that disclosure of being for
being but also constituting such meaning as meaning for us as the guardian of
the abode of being. Thus, the throwness
and situatedness of the historically discerning subject opens up possibility
for a profound and authentic ek-sistence in the world as the actuality of
subjects who act with and for each other and so become who they are. As Heidegger writes:
Ek-sistence so understood is
not only the ground of possibility of reason, ratio, but is also that in which the essence of the human being
preserves the source that determines him, (LOH, p. 247).
Human ek-sistence is characterized by the sheperding of being to
becoming is essentially rooted in dwelling, that is, “to be a human being means
to be on earth as a mortal,” (PLT, p.147).
The earth provides us an abode, and from this abode, we serve as the
provenance of light through which anything that is comes to be. In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture
the things that grow, and specially construct things that do not grow, (PLT, p.
151). To dwell in an abode is to
respect the sacredness of that abode.
To dwell in an abode does not necessarily mean an arbitrary control and
manipulation of that abode because you are a dweller there in. To dwell in a place does not mean to
dominate that place. To be in this
earth as our abode necessitates the need on our part to learn how to
authentically dwell. Heidegger writes:
To dwell, to be set at
peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere
that safeguards each thing in its nature.
The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and dwelling,
(PLT, p. 149).
The
above given assertion of Heidegger regarding dwelling is intended to enlighten
us that to authentically dwell in the cosmos where we are thrown without our
consent necessitates the indispensable need to be one with the earth and all
that there is. Profound dwelling
necessitates the need to live in the spirit of harmony despite our throwness
and situatedness. Thus, the human
person then who dwells in the cosmos should learn to tame his/her rational
perversity towards domination and arbitrary control of anything that there is
and all that is to come by not thinking that he/she possesses language. Heidegger writes:
Man speaks only as he
responds to language. Language
speaks. It’s speaking speaks for us in what has been spoken, (PLT, p. 210).
We should always bear in mind that whenever we think and speak
in language to name that which has been disclosed or that which is about to be
disclosed in the animated game of concealedness and unconcealedness, we are simply
being called to that calling to shed light.
Thus, by naming, we are simply calling being to nearness. By calling, we are inviting being to come
near. By inviting being to come near,
we are bidding being to arrive to what Heidegger called “thinging.” By thinging, being is gestated in the
cosmos. Thus, authentic dwelling needs
profound listening and responding.
Despite our finitude, we should not forget that being the provenance of
light in the cosmos, we should always strive to come up with meaningful logos
to let being be gestated in the play of both absence and presence.
CONCLUSION
In our thematic review on
Wittgenstein and Heidegger on language, we have learned the following germane
points: (1) that despite the
recognition on language as a contextual rule-governed activity, there is still
a need for us to continuously struggle against the bewitchment of human reason
by means of our so called public language or to what Wittgenstein calls the
“language of everyday,” and (2) that we should not just simply arbitrarily
impose our pre-fabricated a priori concepts to anything that is or to anything
that is about to come, thus, we should first learn instead to listen intently
to the speaking of being by means of language.
The
historically discerning subject’s craving for meaning should not lead to the
craving for depth that could move and transcend beyond what is familiar and
mundane. Both approaches used by
Wittgenstein and Heidegger on language lead to one point, and that is the need
to focus and concentrate on what is familiar.
Wittgenstein writes:
We
want to understand something that is already in plain view, (PI 89, p.42). For they see in the essence, not something
that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by rearrangement,
but something beneath the surface, (PI 92, p.43). Nothing is hidden, (PI 435, p.128).
Heidegger also asserts on the need to concentrate on what is
familiar through what he calls the letting be of beings in the open region of
becoming, he writes:
To
let be___that is, to let beings be as the beings that they are___means to
engage oneselfs with the open region and its openness into which every being
comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself, (OET, p.
144).
Nothing is veiled and obscured if and only if we listen
profoundly with open mind, heart and spirit to the voice of being through the
speaking of language before we eventually make a response. Our ontological language-games should give
us focus to what is familiar through profound participation and encounter. Using our ontological language-games, we
should search for meaning not beneath the surface but above the very surface
itself. Passion for depth will only
lead us to the possibility of skewed, distorted and arbitrary
perspectives. Nothing is veiled and
obscured. It is just a matter of seeing
things again because of we tend not to see important things because we used to
see them each day and by placing on them certain apparels and veils through our
common and public language. Because of
the familiarity and simplicity of those that there is, those that are coming
and those that are about to come, we usually fail to see them in the open
region of their becoming.
Furthermore,
language as the open region of becoming of beings is also the same abode where
we come to understand ourselves by letting beings be. Language is our mode of becoming from our
doomness to history/herstory. In order
to experience a meaningful dwelling and at the same time becoming, we have to
faithfully and immaculately acknowledge that we are situated and doomed in
history/herstory. It is our
situatedness in a context that we come to understand ourselves as the
provenance of light in the cosmos. From
our situatedness in a context, it is an undeniable and inescapable fact that we
always see ourselves immersed in certain elemental configurations of pictorial
backgrounds. These elemental
configurations of pictorial backgrounds refer to views, notions and concepts
woven amidst indifference and similitude of communicability through a
diversified spectrum of human relationships to form a background of the self in
our socially constituted reality.
Our
notions of ourselves are not a free packaged gift given to us. The self is that which we create as a
dialogical agent through the presence of elemental configurations of pictorial
backgrounds. We come to know ourselves
through the availability of pictorial backgrounds in our own respective
context. Nonetheless, not all existing
elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds are enabling. The presence then of these elemental
configurations of pictorial backgrounds gives rise to the possibility of
language to become the fountain of power, that is, as both enabling and
disabling. Sometimes, if not all the
times, language is being manipulated by the historically discerning subject to
condition the minds and then to imprison and to enslave in order to suppress
the subjectivity and creativity of his/her fellow human beings. Sometimes, we disable the others in their
self-realization instead of enabling them to become by imprisoning them through
our own “language-games,” imposing upon them our own “games of truth.” Though some of these elemental configurations
of pictorial backgrounds are practically helpful to our desire to fully realize
ourselves as the provenance of light in the cosmos, some of them are
fabrications of a phallic currency aimed at perpetuating the pleasure and
luxury generated by a phallic power.
One example is the basis of filiation provided for by our own civil code
where in the basis of filiation is always the paternal while the maternal is
pitifully and obscurely placed in a non-strategic location between the first
name and the surname that is under the paternal linguistic economy. Another example is Article 96 of our civil
code concerning the administration and enjoyment of the community property
between the husband and wife. Article
124 of the same code concerning the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property has also exactly the same wording except for that simple
revision from community property to conjugal partnership property. Article 96 of the Philippine Civil Code
provides:
The administration and
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
The previously given examples are just few among certain
elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds that suppresses the authentic
self-realization of the other. Such
deceiving and prejudicial elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds
hiding beneath the cloaks of legally enforced laws and the so called
well-respected morality will only create an ideologue self, a self who is not
receptive to change and a self who is devoid of subjectivity, if
epistemological critique is not done.
Thus, a need for “philosophy as the battle against the bewitchment of
our intelligence by means of language,” (PI, p.109). Philosophy as the “actual guardian of reason,”[11]
necessitates the doing of philosophy as an epistemological critique. Doing philosophy as an epistemological
critique of pictorial backgrounds involves an aesthetical disobedience into our
situated context. Allowing the self to
be mesmerized by the passion of waging an epistemological critique to elemental
configurations of pictorial backgrounds that suppresses and hinders authentic
self-realization is but an attempt to live and to perpetuate a creative
humanistic lifestyle. Aesthetical
disobedience to the usually construed universal, necessary and obligatory
should not be interpreted as a means of advancing the whimsical and capricious
interest of an atomistic or a disengaged self, but an attempt to pursue and to
authenticate a creative communal humanistic lifestyle to give rise to
emancipatory and liberative modalities of becoming human.
The
proper task of philosophy is to induce us to abandon skewed, distorted and
arbitrary perspectives that tend to suppress beings from manifesting themselves
to us. Philosophy as the practice of
creative thinking is a way of responding to the speaking of being through
language to formulate and fabricate concepts that in their very nature will
open up the self to other possibilities of becoming within the whole range of
the others.
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[1] Wittgenstein,
Ludwig (April 26, 1889 – April 29 1951) is one of the most influential
philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded by some as the most
important since Immanuel Kant. His early work was influenced by that of
Arthur Schopenhauer and, especially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by
Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend. This work culminated in
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only book that Wittgenstein
published during his lifetime. It claimed to solve all the major problems
of philosophy and was held in especially high esteem by the anti-metaphysical
logical positivists. The Tractatus is based on the idea that
philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of the logic of language,
and it tries to show what this logic is. Wittgenstein's later work, principally
his Philosophical Investigations, shares this concern with logic and
language, but takes a different, less technical, approach to philosophical
problems. This book helped to inspire so-called ordinary language
philosophy. This style of doing philosophy has fallen somewhat out of
favor, but Wittgenstein's work on rule-following and private language is still
considered important, and his later philosophy is influential in a growing
number of fields outside philosophy.
[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974),
PI 18 p. 8. [Hereafter references to
this text will be abbreviated as PI.]
[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture
and Value, trans. Peter Winch, ed. G. H. Von Wright (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 31.
[Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as CAV.]
[4] Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford:
Blackwell Publisher, 1996), p. 125.
[5] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicos, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London:
Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1961), p. 37 (TLP 4.01).
[6] Heidegger, Martin
(September 22, 1889 – May 26, 1976) is acknowledged to be one of the most
original and important philosophers of the 20th century, but also
the most controversial. His thinking has contributed to such diverse fields as
phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), existentialism (Sartre, Ortega y Gasset),
hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoueur), political theory (Arendt, Marcuse),
psychology (Boss, Binswanger, Rolo May), theology (Bultmann, Rahner, Tillich),
and postmodernism (Derrida). His main concern was ontology or the study of being.
In his fundamental treatise, Being and Time, he attempted to access
being (Sein) by means of phenomenological analysis of human existence (Dasein)
in respect to its temporal and historical character. In his later works
Heidegger had stressed the nihilism of modern technological society, and
attempted to win western philosophical tradition back to the question of being.
He placed an emphasis on language as the vehicle through which the question of
being could be unfolded, and on the special role of poetry. His writings are
notoriously difficult. Being and Time remains still his most influential
work.
[7] Martin Heidegger, Letter on
Humanism, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Pathmarks,
ed. William Mcneil (Cambridge University:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 248-249. [Hereafter references to this text will be
abbreviated as LOH.]
[8] Martin Heidegger, On the
Essence of truth, trans. John Sallis, in Pathmarks, ed. William Mcneil (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), p. 139. [Hereafter
references to this text will be abbreviated
as OET.]
[9] Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 146.
[Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as PLT.]
[10] Martin Heidegger, What is
Called Thinking, trans. J. Glenn Gray and Fred Wieck (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1968), p. 126. [Hereafter
references to this text will be abbreviated as WCT.]
[11] Martin Heidegger, What is
Philosophy?, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New York: Twayne
Publishers, Inc., 1958), p. 108.
