Tuesday, September 9, 2014

THE HOMO SAPIENS AND THE “HOUSE” OF ITS BE-ING IN THE WORLD

THE HOMO SAPIENS AND THE
“HOUSE” OF ITS
BE-ING IN THE WORLD
Atty. Mark Gil J. Ramolete, MA Philos


INTRODUCTION


It is not the aim of this paper to conceive and then to gestate a crystallize definition of language using two famous European philosophers.   The primary aim of this paper is simply to provide a mere description of language through a thematic review on Heidegger and Wittgenstein concerning their respective philosophical projects on language.   In an attempt to describe language, it is important to note that language should not be forced to succumb to our linguistic currency in order to satisfy our demand for clarity and certainty.
     To begin with the embryonic stage of our discussion, it is quite important to bear in mind that the species Homo sapiens are the only species that have evolved with an advanced system of communication.   Humans have developed linguistic currencies that can express a variety of separate and distinct thoughts.   This marvelous evolutionary leap is what distinguished the human specie from all other species existing in the cosmos.
     Starting from the pre-Socratic philosophers up to the present milieu, philosophy as a lifestyle or a mode of being and as a field of study has been overwhelmingly pervaded with an atmosphere of passion and desire to search for meaning, not just simply meaning but aesthetic meaning of one’s existence and its relatedness to the perceived and experienced reality.   The human person’s craving for meaning is what gave birth to philosophy.   However, philosophy would not be possible if it is not being immersed into the vast and dynamic realm of language.   The “dasein” or the existent subject together with other beings come into the realm of language to be, the same through with philosophy as a way of life and as a field of concern.
     Reality as the source of meaning is always pillared through language.   Language serves as the matrix through which reality is constituted, pictured and interpreted.   Reality then becomes sensible, logical and intelligible because of language.   However, this view is not sufficient enough to say that meaning is sensible.   There is a need to expand the said view by saying that meaning is sensible, logical and intelligible because of language as something social, contextual, practical and rule-governed.   Claiming language as such shall lead us to the existential character of the “dasein” as “thrown” in the cosmos serving as the provenance of light where being comes to be.
     In order that my thematic discussion on Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language shall yield a crystallize understanding, I would like to suggest that we should not simply interpret and confine our knowledge on language as simply grammar, as mere utterance of a living organism, as mere thought formulated in terms of symbolic character or in terms of the character of signification, but also as the clearing-concealing field where being comes to be and not comes to be.

Ludwig Wittgenstein[1] on language: the existential approach
     Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.[2]   This symbolical approach to language provided for by Wittgenstein reiterates the fact that language is a sedimentation of various modalities of life from various eras.   As time changes, different forms or life mirroring the sentiments, feelings, needs and customary habits of a particular milieu are also constituted.   It would be an illusion to speak of a one to one correspondence between a word and the object through which this word stands for because language is never kept unchanged within the course of time.   To crystallize the point I am driving at, let us take the case of the word “family” as our example.   In the past, when people hear the word family, what immediately materializes in the mind with clarity and certainty is the orthodox notion of a family that a family is a basic social institution composing of a father, mother and child.   However, with the advent of the postmodern era, the orthodox notion of a family has been completely revolutionized to incorporate what we call now in our current milieu, the alternative form of family composing either of both man or both woman and the child.   To use now the word family in our present context, one has to be clear with the self what paradigm of family is being used to avoid linguistic misunderstanding or confusion.   With the given example, we can say that through the journey of time, language is never immortalized.   This nonimmortalization of language is supported by Wittgenstein by arguing that “language__I want to say is a refinement.”[3]   Thus, there is no such thing as an absolute and universal linguistic currency within the mind of the speaking and thinking subject.
     It is but an inescapable fact that language is indeed a sedimentation of diversified modalities of life or forms of life from various eras.   To further substantiate the said claim, Wittgenstein argues that “to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life,” (PI 18, p. 8).   The form of life that Wittgenstein is trying to drive at refers to “a culture or social formation and the totality of communal activities or practices.”[4]   To create now a mental picture of language, one should be able to recognize and to ascertain the culture at work.   Conceptualizing and understanding language would necessitate the need to take a look and comprehend the customary activities and practices that are socially fashioned and established.   The situatedness of language through different and distinct forms of life reflects the dynamism of meaning.   Meaning always changes and differs from one situation to another situation or from one context to another context.   Language as rooted in a particular juncture of time and in a particular juncture of place and manifested through the existing modality of life constitutes the matrix where the dynamic unfolding of meaning takes place.   To concretize the point I am driving at, let us take the case of greeting a person “good morning” as our example.   Let us say for example I went to a department store to shop.   Upon entering the store, I saw you together with a lady friend of yours.   That lady friend of yours is a French national.   You greeted me and said, “naimbag nga bigat mo” and I also greeted you by saying, “naimbag met nga bigat mo.”   After you greeted me, you introduced me to your companion.   After you introduced me to your friend, I also greeted your friend by saying, “naimbag nga bigat mo adding.” You interrupted then by saying to your companion, “my friend here said bonjour mademoiselle.”   After a few minutes communicating with each other, we eventually said goodbye.   From the given example, it has been clearly pointed out that language and the meaning that language generates is always rooted in a context.   This contextualization of language and at the same time meaning has been given emphasis by Wittgenstein.   He writes:
What is happening now has significance___in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance, (PI 583, p. 153).

      The existence of various and diversified modalities of life in a given specified milieu ensures the dynamic instead of a static constitution of meaning, thus, Wittgenstein further writes:
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”___It is what human beings say is true and false; and they agree in the language they use.   That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life, (PI 241, p. 88).

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments, (PI 242, p. 88).

      The creation of meaning through a cooperative and communal enterprise asserts the fact that language is by nature social or communal.   The meaning of a word or an action is agreed upon by a group of people or a culture in a particular spatio-temporal context where constellation of meaning is embedded.   Furthermore, the cosmos is a composite of diversified cultures and races, and as long as this character of the cosmos remains unchanged, reality is and will always be a constellation of meaning.   In order that there will be a unity in diversity in the cosmos arising from these diversified cultures and races as the womb of constellated meaning, the meaning of a word or an act must be agreed upon through convention for the sensibility and comprehensibility of such meaning.   Wittgenstein, in this case, emphasizes the point that there is no such thing as a private language but public language.   This public character of language opens up possibilities for a fruitful dialogue not just with the self, but also within the whole range of the others.   We can never extract language from a socio-cultural context whenever we want to legitimate the meaning of a word.   Language never ceases itself to be with a background because it is through with a background that language makes a meaning sensible, comprehensible and intelligible.   In order to maintain the integrity of a meaning arising from a context, it must be maintained and preserved through its union with the same contextual background.
     Furthermore, aside from being social and communal, “language is an instrument.   Its concepts are instruments,” (PI 569, p. 151).   Through certain concepts provided for by language, it is made possible to engage ourselves in a sort of hermeneutical contact with reality.   Through the use of concepts, we allow reality to speak to us as a linguistic phenomenon.   Concepts are indeed indispensable content of our linguistic currency because “concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expressions of our interest and direct our interest,” (PI 570, p. 151).   Thus, we say then that language is our medium to reality.   Language gives us a glimpse of reality.   Language bridges us to reality.   How is it possible then for language to create a bridge between us and reality?   Wittgenstein writes:
A proposition is a picture of reality.   A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.[5]

     Through the mirroring power of language, the possibility of creating a bridge between us and reality is made to materialize.   As a sign of respect to Wittgenstein, it is quite significant to give a cautious and sensitive notice on the word “model” that he used in his argument.   Speaking of model, Wittgenstein is not trying to pursue here the claim that language leads us to see reality as it is.   Using the word model should give us a hint that language provides us a portrait, a sketch or a paradigm to comprehend and visualize reality as it appears to us.   Thus, Wittgenstein reiterates that “we must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place,” (PI 109, p. 47).  
The view of picturing reality through language must not be misconstrued as an attempt to define but to demonstrate reality as portrayable.   Any attempt to define reality shall only hinder and suppress the dynamic unfolding and evolution of meaning from various nodes and modalities of human linguistic currency.   To drive the discussion further, speaking now of language as an instrument, language and the meaning it generates should not be simply limited from its mere surrounding.   Considering language as an instrument necessitates also the need to consider the practicality of a word vis-à-vis to its contextual background.   Wittgenstein reiterates then that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language,” (PI 43, p. 20).   Now here is an example to ponder with.   Let us say for example that while I am sharpening my pencil inside my room, you knocked at the door of my room and said, “can I borrow your pencil sharpener?”   Answering you back, I said, “you wait for a moment until I am done sharpening my pencil.”   After a few minutes, I came to your room and handed you a kitchen knife.   Upon seeing the kitchen knife, you reacted by saying, “I did not ask you a kitchen knife but a pencil sharpener!”   I answered back by saying, “this knife that I am holding is the pencil sharpener that I was using when you asked me to borrow my pencil sharpener!”   Since you badly needed to sharpen your pencil and I also do not have a real pencil sharpener intended for pencils, you took the kitchen knife from me and you started sharpening your pencil.   From the given example, two different meanings were at work between the two actors involved.   Two different meanings were conceived arising from two different situation or context.   Furthermore, from the previously given example, I interpreted that you wanted to use the same kitchen knife to sharpen your pencil because during that time that you asked me to borrow my pencil sharpener, I was using the said kitchen knife to sharpen my pencil.   Thus, to discern and comprehend the meaning of a word, there is a need to free our thoughts from the illusionary belief that the object through which a word stands for is the sole matrix and fountain of meaning for that word.   In unveiling and disclosing the real meaning of a used word, it requires a certain degree of sensitivity on the practical use of a word from its contextual background.
Different variety of meaning arises because of the presence of different variety of language.   There are different varieties of language in our linguistic economy because there are different forms and modalities of life that serves as the matrix of a variety of different “language-games.”   Speaking of language-game, Wittgenstein writes:

      I shall call the whole, consisting language and the actions into which it     is woven, the “language-game,” (PI 7, p. 5).

Engaging ourselves with language presupposes a kind of activity, that is, a rule governed activity that can create intimate connections.   With the creation of intimate connections, we are enabled to perceive and recognize certain degree of similitude and interconnectedness in our belongingness with the whole range of the others.   Wittgenstein writes:
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,___but they are related to one another in many different ways.   And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all “language,” (PI 65, p. 31).

     Language is like those games that we play that once we are consummated or mesmerized by the game, we continue playing the game harmoniously with the other players.   Having experienced once to play the game could give us a first hand and immediate encounter on the basic rules of the game.   The second time around that we play the game, we already have in mind a meaningful view on how to start and eventually inter-subjectively immersed the self in the game.   However, the possibility for tension and discord to arise is still inevitable despite the nature of language as a rule governed activity.   Any breach in linguistic currency could be the possible result of an inadequate response to the established rules of the game or it can also be that the rules have already become insufficient to represent the modality of life existing through the progress of time.   Thus, the need for refinement.   Despite the nature of language as the product of agreement to ensure meaningful communication, language never remains to be static.   Wittgenstein writes:
We are struggling with language.   We are engaged in a struggle with language, (CAV, p. 11).

Our language-games should always be receptive to the possibility of change for a meaningful encounter with reality.   Despite the recognition we have given to language as a contextual rule-governed activity, rules on the use of language need not be that absolute, universal and necessary to allow the dynamism of reality to unfold.   The dynamism of reality should not be constrained to unfold through the use of certain logical or mathematical formulas to prove the validity of certain facts in reality.






Martin Heidegger[6] on language: the ontological approach
When we speak of language, are we simply referring here to mere speech or to those different forms of expressions we use?   Is language a phenomenon that belongs to the human person in as much as it is only the human person who is capable of rigid and methodical thinking?   Is language a treasure possessed by the human person to constitute his/her being or is it language that possessed the historical subject?   Heidegger in his Letter on Humanism provides us an answer to these questions that we have posted.   Heidegger writes:
In its essence, language is not the utterance of an organism nor is it the expression of a living thing.   Nor can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character of signification.[7]

     The given assertion of Heidegger on language enunciates two significant points about what language is not.   These two germane points are as follows:   (1) that language is not about the logical and methodical construction of statements, propositions or arguments, and (2) that language is not about human speech and expressions used to expediate communication between and among historical subjects.
     To start with our discussion, logic always involves the use of statements, propositions or arguments.   These statements, propositions or arguments are all constituted by words or by conceptual frameworks.   Since in logic, we are dealing with words or concepts, then are we not also engaging ourselves with language?   As what we have said previously, language is not about the logical and methodical construction of statements, propositions or arguments.   With this assertion that we have on language, you might now be asking, what are we driving at when we speak of language?   What is wrong if we claim otherwise that language is the logical and methodical construction of statements, propositions or arguments?   Heidegger responds to these questions, he writes:
That the essence of propositional truth consists in the correctness of statements is thought to need no further special proof.[8]

     What does Heidegger driving at with the above given assertion?   Before we answer this question, let us try to discuss first what we are trying to convey when we use the term logic.   Logic is occasionally defined as the philosophic science that evaluates arguments and inferences to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning.   With this definition of logic, we can say that an argument is considered logically sound and valid when the conclusion is equal to or lesser than the given premises but not greater nor stronger because we cannot derive more than the source.   Furthermore, in order to trace the validity of an argument, one ought to examine critically the truthfulness or falsity of the given propositions or statements that constitute an argument.   Thus, we say then that one cannot derive a false conclusion if the given premises are both true; otherwise, the argument is invalid.   From this discussion that we have on logic, we have encountered the notion of a propositional truth.   But what do we mean with propositional truth?   Heidegger writes:
Propositional truth is possible only on the basis of material truth, of adequatio rei ad intellectum [adequation of thing to intellect], (OET, p. 138).

     To concretize the assertion given by Heidegger, let us try to consider this example: If God is subjected to time and space, then God is imperfect because God is prone to change and error.   God is not imperfect because God is not prone to change and error.   Therefore, God is not subjected to time and space.   From this given example, we have established a certain notion about God, that is, by making God succumb to our rigid and methodical construction of a sound argument.   In our desire to know God, we have made God succumb to our conceptual categories.   However, the undeniable truth still prevails that God is beyond any linguistic phenomena.   Thus, language cannot be equal to logical truth because language will only be conferred to the easy disposal of the human subject.   The problem with material truth as the basis of propositional truth is that “material truth always signifies the consonance of something at hand with the ‘rational’ concept of its essence,” (OET, p. 139).   If language is equated to logical truth, the unveiling of the truth of anything that there is or is about to come or is present in any modality of presencing shall only be reduced to a subject centered fishing exhibition through the imposition of certain “categories of the mind.”   The authentic notion of truth has its origin in language and neither on logical truth nor material truth because as Heidegger writes:
Truth is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an “object” by a human “subject” and then “are valid” somewhere, in what sphere we know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which openness essentially unfolds, (OET, p. 146).

     The unveilment of truth about any being is not a subject centered enterprise.   The unveilment of truth about any being takes place within the domain or realm of language where the human person serves as the medium where the process of becoming is ensured.   Language therefore is not about the logical and methodical construction of statements.   This assertion that we have on language seeks to show us that language is the domain where the disclosure of something that there is or is about to come or is present in any form of presencing unfolds in its concealedness or unconcealdness or even both.
     To drive further our discussion, we have asserted earlier that language is not also about human speech and expressions used to facilitate communication between and among historical subjects.   In order to convince us on the second claim that we have made on language in the form of a negation, Heidegger writes:
Language thereby falls into the service of expediating communication along routes where objectification____the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone____branches out and disregards all limits.   In this way, language comes under the dictatorship of the public realm which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected intelligible, (LOH, p. 242).

     The assertion made by Heidegger is intended to convince us that if we claim the contrary that language is about human speech and expressions used to expediate communication between and among historically discerning subjects, such claim will only immerse language into the totalitarian, autocratic and arbitrary grip of the human subject.   Furthermore, if we have made the contrary claim, such assertion on language will deny us its profound and vivid essence as “the house of the truth of being,” (LOH, p. 243).   In order to have a fruitful and meaningful encounter with anything that there is or is about to come or is present in any modality of presencing, it is a must for us as historically discerning subjects not to allow language to “surrender to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over being, (LOH, p. 243).   Now, let us take this an example to substantiate our discussion.   Let us say that I am holding with my right hand a metallic object.   I then ask you, “is this metallic object a true ball pen?”   Using your sense of sight, you replied and said, “that is indeed a ball pen!”   You have made such remark because the metallic object unmistakably resembles a ball pen.   However, after I have opened the metallic object, you have noticed that it is not an authentic ball pen, but rather a bladed object that resembles a knife.   From this example that we have, sometimes if not all the times, we have the unrestricted drive to impose our humanly pre-fabricated a priori concepts to any being that we encounter in our midst in order to provide us a logical approach to our socially constituted reality.   Thus, we say then that “man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man.”[9]   It is our customary notion that we are the shapers and masters of language because we possess both the faculty to think and the faculty to speak.   However, the possessions of these faculties are not sufficient guarantee for us to say that we are the shapers and masters of language.   We are neither the shapers nor masters of language because we are just simply responding to that which is or is present in any modality of presencing to disclose or to unveil it in a linguistic form.   Heidegger writes:
We are capable of thinking only in so far as we are endowed with what is most thought-provoking, gifted with what ever and always want to be thought about.[10]

     Language and being are reciprocally connected with each other.   Language and being are intimately connected with each other through a kind of nuptial or mutual relation because “language is the house of being,” (LOH, p.239).   To confer then language at the autocratic and arbitrary grip of the historically discerning subject will only sever the reciprocal relation between language and being.   Having recognized this reciprocal relation between language and being, let us now try also to unveil the connection of thinking to language and at the same time the connection of thinking to being.   To begin with our discussion, we say in a Heideggerian perspective that we are thinking not because we possess the faculty to think, but we are rather thinking because that which is or is about to come or is present in some way in any modality of presencing is calling through its animating voice that faculty of ours to think.   To make the point we are driving at clearer, let us try to consider this example: Let us say that as a friend of mine, you have helped me overcome my suicidal tendency and my sense of hopelessness with life through a fruitful guidance counseling session.   I then told you, “gayem, addaan ka iti nasinaw a panagpuspuso.   Agyamannak iti saan to pulos a mabayadan a tulong mo nga nangipamatmat ken nangiparikna kanniak ti pudno a kaipapanan iti biag.”   I was able to utter those statements directed to you because you have with you that being that has animated my own being to instigate my own faculty of thinking to respond to that calling of your being in you to be thought in its essential nature through a linguistic form.   I may have uttered those words to embody in a linguistic form that which has invigorated me to think; nonetheless, I cannot yet say conclusively and with absolute certainty that I have already embodied in a linguistic form the totality of the speaking of that being that has called me to speak because as Heidegger writes:
That which calls on us to think and appeals to us to think, claims thought for itself and as its own, because by itself it gives food  for thought____not just occasionally but now and always.   What so gives food for thought is what we call most though-provoking.   Nor does it give only what always remains to be thought about; it gives food for thought in much wider-reaching and decisive sense that it first entrusts thought and thinking to us as what determines our nature, (WCT, p. 125).

     Whenever we think, we always rely on the sheltering of language.   We are thinking that which is or is about to come or is present in any modality of presencing because language provide us the abode or the dwelling place to think.   We have this assertion regarding thinking in order not to lost sight of our constantly repeated claim that language is the abode of being.   With language as the abode of being, “what calls on us to think, demands for itself that it be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own essential nature, by though,” (WCT, p. 121).   Thinking as coming into the vast realm of language shows the experiential and existential essence of the human person as the provenance of light in the cosmos in order that something may come to be.   Thinking as coming into the abode of being radiates the ingenious light of the human person as the receptacle for the letting be of beings in the cosmos.   Heidegger further elaborates to us the letting be of beings through the guidance of the ingenious light possessed by the human person, he writes:
The human being is the shepherd of beings, (LOH, p. 252).
     It is quite clear from the above given assertion by Heidegger that the human person is not the creator of beings but simply the shepherd of beings.   The human person who appropriates meaning in the cosmos should be like a teacher who do not impose nor coerce his/her students to learn, but simply guides his/her students to become through proper thought and training.   Seeing the human person as the historically discerning subject is to consider the human person as the unfolding of a life course in the cosmos in order that something comes to be.   However, despite the ingenious light possessed by the historically discerning subject as the provenance of light in the cosmos, there is still the possibility for being not to be disclosed and unveiled.   Heidegger writes:
Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being itself, (LOH, p. 249).
Language here is seen as the field where being comes to be and not comes to be.   Language is the necessary condition in order that being comes to be in its actual sense.   The unveiling of being happens through language because it is through the vast and rich realm of language that being is explicitated or actualized through a fruitful dialogue and encounter with reality.   On the other hand, being has the tendency to conceal itself into the vast and rich realm of language because of the dynamism of reality and because of the possible result of an unfruitful dialogue with the dynamic and immensely rich reality.   This clearing-concealing advent of being itself through the rich realm of language is being explained further by Heidegger through what he calls “telling:”
Telling is the business of language, (WCT, p. 206).
If telling is the business of language, what does language tell?   According to Martin Heidegger, what language tells, what it speaks and what it keeps silent, is and remains always and everywhere what is, what can be, what has been, and what is about to come____most directly and abundantly where the term “is” and “be” are not specifically given voice.   The telling here as the business of language is part and parcel of thinking.   The clearing of the truth of being according to Heidegger happens in thinking, in thinking whose prime nature is being linguistic as the engagement by and for the truth of being.   Engagement by being for being according to Heidegger is a way of embracing a “thing” or a “person” in their essence through a fruitful dialogue and encounter.   To embrace a “thing” or a “person” in their essence means to love them, to understand them, to favor them, (LOT, p. 241).   Such an act of embrace, though sometimes difficult to do because of the historically discerning subject’s tendency to become subjectivist, is in the proper essence of enabling.   This act of embracing does not only seek to achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance like a newly blossomed flower, that is let it be.   Thus, it is only appropriate to say that we should not speak for someone but let that someone speak for himself/herself.   An engagement with being happens in thinking through telling which requires time for listening to yield a fruitful dialogue or encounter.
Furthermore, through what Heidegger calls “ek-sistence,” the historically discerning subject shepherds being into becoming.   By shepherding being to becoming, we constitute not only the meaning of that disclosure of being for being but also constituting such meaning as meaning for us as the guardian of the abode of being.   Thus, the throwness and situatedness of the historically discerning subject opens up possibility for a profound and authentic ek-sistence in the world as the actuality of subjects who act with and for each other and so become who they are.   As Heidegger writes:
Ek-sistence so understood is not only the ground of possibility of reason, ratio, but is also that in which the essence of the human being preserves the source that determines him, (LOH, p. 247).

      Human ek-sistence is characterized by the sheperding of being to becoming is essentially rooted in dwelling, that is, “to be a human being means to be on earth as a mortal,” (PLT, p.147).   The earth provides us an abode, and from this abode, we serve as the provenance of light through which anything that is comes to be.   In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture the things that grow, and specially construct things that do not grow, (PLT, p. 151).   To dwell in an abode is to respect the sacredness of that abode.   To dwell in an abode does not necessarily mean an arbitrary control and manipulation of that abode because you are a dweller there in.   To dwell in a place does not mean to dominate that place.   To be in this earth as our abode necessitates the need on our part to learn how to authentically dwell.   Heidegger writes:
To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature.   The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and dwelling, (PLT, p. 149).

     The above given assertion of Heidegger regarding dwelling is intended to enlighten us that to authentically dwell in the cosmos where we are thrown without our consent necessitates the indispensable need to be one with the earth and all that there is.   Profound dwelling necessitates the need to live in the spirit of harmony despite our throwness and situatedness.   Thus, the human person then who dwells in the cosmos should learn to tame his/her rational perversity towards domination and arbitrary control of anything that there is and all that is to come by not thinking that he/she possesses language.   Heidegger writes:
Man speaks only as he responds to language.   Language speaks.   It’s speaking speaks for us in what has been spoken, (PLT, p. 210).

      We should always bear in mind that whenever we think and speak in language to name that which has been disclosed or that which is about to be disclosed in the animated game of concealedness and unconcealedness, we are simply being called to that calling to shed light.   Thus, by naming, we are simply calling being to nearness.   By calling, we are inviting being to come near.   By inviting being to come near, we are bidding being to arrive to what Heidegger called “thinging.”   By thinging, being is gestated in the cosmos.   Thus, authentic dwelling needs profound listening and responding.   Despite our finitude, we should not forget that being the provenance of light in the cosmos, we should always strive to come up with meaningful logos to let being be gestated in the play of both absence and presence.

CONCLUSION
In our thematic review on Wittgenstein and Heidegger on language, we have learned the following germane points:   (1) that despite the recognition on language as a contextual rule-governed activity, there is still a need for us to continuously struggle against the bewitchment of human reason by means of our so called public language or to what Wittgenstein calls the “language of everyday,” and (2) that we should not just simply arbitrarily impose our pre-fabricated a priori concepts to anything that is or to anything that is about to come, thus, we should first learn instead to listen intently to the speaking of being by means of language.
     The historically discerning subject’s craving for meaning should not lead to the craving for depth that could move and transcend beyond what is familiar and mundane.   Both approaches used by Wittgenstein and Heidegger on language lead to one point, and that is the need to focus and concentrate on what is familiar.   Wittgenstein writes:
We want to understand something that is already in plain view, (PI 89, p.42).   For they see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by rearrangement, but something beneath the surface, (PI 92, p.43).   Nothing is hidden, (PI 435, p.128).

      Heidegger also asserts on the need to concentrate on what is familiar through what he calls the letting be of beings in the open region of becoming, he writes:
To let be___that is, to let beings be as the beings that they are___means to engage oneselfs with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself, (OET, p. 144).

      Nothing is veiled and obscured if and only if we listen profoundly with open mind, heart and spirit to the voice of being through the speaking of language before we eventually make a response.   Our ontological language-games should give us focus to what is familiar through profound participation and encounter.   Using our ontological language-games, we should search for meaning not beneath the surface but above the very surface itself.   Passion for depth will only lead us to the possibility of skewed, distorted and arbitrary perspectives.   Nothing is veiled and obscured.   It is just a matter of seeing things again because of we tend not to see important things because we used to see them each day and by placing on them certain apparels and veils through our common and public language.   Because of the familiarity and simplicity of those that there is, those that are coming and those that are about to come, we usually fail to see them in the open region of their becoming.
     Furthermore, language as the open region of becoming of beings is also the same abode where we come to understand ourselves by letting beings be.   Language is our mode of becoming from our doomness to history/herstory.   In order to experience a meaningful dwelling and at the same time becoming, we have to faithfully and immaculately acknowledge that we are situated and doomed in history/herstory.   It is our situatedness in a context that we come to understand ourselves as the provenance of light in the cosmos.   From our situatedness in a context, it is an undeniable and inescapable fact that we always see ourselves immersed in certain elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds.   These elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds refer to views, notions and concepts woven amidst indifference and similitude of communicability through a diversified spectrum of human relationships to form a background of the self in our socially constituted reality.
     Our notions of ourselves are not a free packaged gift given to us.   The self is that which we create as a dialogical agent through the presence of elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds.   We come to know ourselves through the availability of pictorial backgrounds in our own respective context.   Nonetheless, not all existing elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds are enabling.   The presence then of these elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds gives rise to the possibility of language to become the fountain of power, that is, as both enabling and disabling.   Sometimes, if not all the times, language is being manipulated by the historically discerning subject to condition the minds and then to imprison and to enslave in order to suppress the subjectivity and creativity of his/her fellow human beings.   Sometimes, we disable the others in their self-realization instead of enabling them to become by imprisoning them through our own “language-games,” imposing upon them our own “games of truth.”   Though some of these elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds are practically helpful to our desire to fully realize ourselves as the provenance of light in the cosmos, some of them are fabrications of a phallic currency aimed at perpetuating the pleasure and luxury generated by a phallic power.   One example is the basis of filiation provided for by our own civil code where in the basis of filiation is always the paternal while the maternal is pitifully and obscurely placed in a non-strategic location between the first name and the surname that is under the paternal linguistic economy.   Another example is Article 96 of our civil code concerning the administration and enjoyment of the community property between the husband and wife.   Article 124 of the same code concerning the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property has also exactly the same wording except for that simple revision from community property to conjugal partnership property.   Article 96 of the Philippine Civil Code provides:
The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly.   In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

      The previously given examples are just few among certain elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds that suppresses the authentic self-realization of the other.   Such deceiving and prejudicial elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds hiding beneath the cloaks of legally enforced laws and the so called well-respected morality will only create an ideologue self, a self who is not receptive to change and a self who is devoid of subjectivity, if epistemological critique is not done.   Thus, a need for “philosophy as the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language,” (PI, p.109).   Philosophy as the “actual guardian of reason,”[11] necessitates the doing of philosophy as an epistemological critique.   Doing philosophy as an epistemological critique of pictorial backgrounds involves an aesthetical disobedience into our situated context.   Allowing the self to be mesmerized by the passion of waging an epistemological critique to elemental configurations of pictorial backgrounds that suppresses and hinders authentic self-realization is but an attempt to live and to perpetuate a creative humanistic lifestyle.   Aesthetical disobedience to the usually construed universal, necessary and obligatory should not be interpreted as a means of advancing the whimsical and capricious interest of an atomistic or a disengaged self, but an attempt to pursue and to authenticate a creative communal humanistic lifestyle to give rise to emancipatory and liberative modalities of becoming human.
     The proper task of philosophy is to induce us to abandon skewed, distorted and arbitrary perspectives that tend to suppress beings from manifesting themselves to us.   Philosophy as the practice of creative thinking is a way of responding to the speaking of being through language to formulate and fabricate concepts that in their very nature will open up the self to other possibilities of becoming within the whole range of the others.
















Bibliography



Clarke, W. Norris. Central Problems of Metaphysics. Edited by Nemesio Que. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University, 1995.

Cooper, David E. Postmodernism and ‘the end of philosophy.’ In The  Politics of Postmodernity, edited by James Good and Irving Velody. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Datur, Francoise. Language and Ereignis. In Reading Heidegger, edited by John Sallis. USA: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Glock, Hans-Johann. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Balckwell Publisher, 1996.

Heidegger, Martin. What is Philosophy?, Translated by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc, 1958.

__________. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

__________. What is Called Thinking. Translated by J. Glenn Gray and Fred Wieck. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1968.

__________. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

__________. Letter on Humanism. Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi. In Pathmarks, edited by William Mcneil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

__________. On the Essence of Truth. Translated by John Sallis. In Pathmarks, edited by William Mcneil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Hutto, Daniel D. More Making Sense of Nonsense: From Logical Forms to Forms of life. In Post-Analytic Tractatus, edited by Barny Stocker, 2004.

Johnson, Patricia Altenbernd. On Heidegger. California: Wadsworth, 2000.

Palmer, Donald. Looking at Philosophy. California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2001.

Paras, Edgardo, Civil Code of the Philippines (Annotated). Volume 1 (Persons and Family Relations. Quezon City: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2002.

Roth, John and Sontag, Frederick. The Questions of Philosophy. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicos. Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1961.

__________. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.

__________. Culture and Value. Translated by Peter Winch. Edited by G.H. Von Wright. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.






                                                               



    


         

















[1] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (April 26, 1889 – April 29 1951) is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded by some as the most important since Immanuel Kant.  His early work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer and, especially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend.  This work culminated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only book that Wittgenstein published during his lifetime.  It claimed to solve all the major problems of philosophy and was held in especially high esteem by the anti-metaphysical logical positivists.  The Tractatus is based on the idea that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of the logic of language, and it tries to show what this logic is. Wittgenstein's later work, principally his Philosophical Investigations, shares this concern with logic and language, but takes a different, less technical, approach to philosophical problems.  This book helped to inspire so-called ordinary language philosophy.  This style of doing philosophy has fallen somewhat out of favor, but Wittgenstein's work on rule-following and private language is still considered important, and his later philosophy is influential in a growing number of fields outside philosophy.
[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), PI 18 p. 8.   [Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as PI.]
[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, ed. G. H. Von Wright (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 31.   [Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as CAV.]
[4] Hans-Johann Glock,   A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 1996), p. 125.  
[5] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicos, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1961), p. 37 (TLP 4.01).
[6] Heidegger, Martin (September 22, 1889 – May 26, 1976) is acknowledged to be one of the most original and important philosophers of the 20th century, but also the most controversial. His thinking has contributed to such diverse fields as phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), existentialism (Sartre, Ortega y Gasset), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoueur), political theory (Arendt, Marcuse), psychology (Boss, Binswanger, Rolo May), theology (Bultmann, Rahner, Tillich), and postmodernism (Derrida). His main concern was ontology or the study of being. In his fundamental treatise, Being and Time, he attempted to access being (Sein) by means of phenomenological analysis of human existence (Dasein) in respect to its temporal and historical character. In his later works Heidegger had stressed the nihilism of modern technological society, and attempted to win western philosophical tradition back to the question of being. He placed an emphasis on language as the vehicle through which the question of being could be unfolded, and on the special role of poetry. His writings are notoriously difficult. Being and Time remains still his most influential work.
[7] Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Pathmarks, ed. William Mcneil (Cambridge University:   Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 248-249.   [Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as LOH.]
[8] Martin Heidegger, On the Essence of truth, trans. John Sallis, in Pathmarks, ed. William Mcneil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 139.   [Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated  as OET.]
[9] Martin Heidegger,  Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 146.   [Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as PLT.]
[10] Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, trans. J. Glenn Gray and Fred Wieck (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 126.   [Hereafter references to this text will be abbreviated as WCT.]
[11] Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1958), p. 108.

Thursday, February 20, 2014

The Median Principle of Morality

THE DISCUSSION BELOW CAME FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THROUGH WHICH I AM INDEBTED; NONETHELESS, THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWS IS PRIMARILY BASED ON THE MAIN TEXT OF THE SCHOLAR ARISTOTLE'S "NICOMACHEAN ETHICS" (ARISTOTLE On Man in the Universe, Edited with Introduction by Louise Romes Loomis, Published for the Classic Club by Walter J. Black, Inc: Roslyn, New York)

Happiness as the “chief good”
= The contention is insufficient unless we philosophize what happiness is
a.)                to know its nature
b.)                to know how to achieve it

                                       ║
                                       ║
                                      ▼

What is the function of the Human Person?
= Such function must be unique or peculiar to the human person
a.)                that it belongs to the rational part of man
b.)                that it finds expression in action

= The rational part of the human person can be active or passive.  It is passive in that it follows the dictates of reason.  It is active in that it possesses and exercises the ability to reason.  Similarly, since the reasonable element of rational life may be active or passive, we must make it clear that we are discussing a life determined by the USE, as opposed to the mere possession, of rational faculty.
                          
                                       ║
                                       ║
                                      ▼

What is then Happiness?
            = Happiness is an activity of the soul which is in accordance with virtue and which is in conformity with reason

                                       ║
                                       ║
                                      ▼

Hence, the claim that Happiness is the “chief good” will only suffice provided that we see the attainment of Happiness in connection with the human person’s use of its ability to reason.


Aristotle says in Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, since Happiness is some activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence or virtue, we should discuss the subject of excellence; for perhaps in this way we shall get a better view of happiness too.

There are two kinds of virtue or excellence:
a.)                Intellectual virtue is the result of learning or teaching
b.)                Moral Virtue is the result of practice or habituation

Ethics is a subject of great practical importance as well as theoretical interest, because we are interested not merely in determining the nature of goodness, but also on how we may become good men.  For this reason, it is necessary to investigate the problems of right and wrong actions and proper conduct, for, our actions govern the characteristics we develop.

It is generally conceded that persons must act according to what they consider the right principle of reason.  We have to remember that the nature of moral qualities is such that they can be destroyed either by deficiency or excess.  Just as too much or too little food or exercise is bad for the body, so the person who fears everything becomes coward and the man who fears nothing becomes reckless or foolhardy, and neither is able to develop the virtue of courage.  This same rule holds in regard to all the virtues.  Excess or deficiency destroys them.  Action in accordance with a mean produces and maintains them.

Moral excellence is primarily a matter of concern with pleasure and pain.  The following points are relevant here:

1.      The pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the main causes of evil action, for pleasure can make men do have things and pain can deter them from doing noble things. This is why Plato said that right education is matters of making persons feel pleasure and pain for the right reasons.

2.      Virtue is concerned with actions and feelings or emotions and these may be accompanied by pleasure or pain.

3.      Pain is used as an instrument of punishment, for nature works by means of opposites and pain can have a remedial effect in the case of vicious men.

4.      Every characteristic of the soul shows its true nature in regard to those factors that can make it better or worse. Persons become corrupted through pleasure and pain, either by pursuing or avoiding pleasure or pain of the wrong kind, at the wrong time, or in the wrong way. This indicates that the object of ethics is to learn to feel pleasure or pain for the right reasons. We may assume that virtue enables men to act in the best way in matters involving pleasure and pain, and that vice does the opposite.

At this point it has been determined that Moral good ness is a quality disposing men to act in the best way while dealing with pleasures and pains, and that vice disposes them to act in the worst way in the same situation.

In all actions, to some extent, pleasure and pain are used as standard.  Virtue is not to be interpreted as freedom from pleasure and pain.  Rather these are the materials which, when molded into the right form, enable us to become virtuous. To sump up, the following conclusions can be made:

1.      Virtue or excellence is some caused with pleasure or pain.
2.      The actions, which produce virtue, are identical in character with those that increase it.
3.      These same actions differently performed can destroy virtue.
4.      Virtue finds expression or is actualized in the same activities that produce it.


When are we to consider an act to be a virtuous act?
            = A virtuous act is not virtuous only because it is an act of certain quality or kind.  The agent or doer of a virtuous act must also be in a certain frame of mind and have certain characteristics when s(he) acts.  There are three conditions required: (a) that the agent must be fully conscious of what s(he) is doing, (b) that s(he) must deliberately choose or will (he)r action, and must choose it for its own sake, (c) that the act must proceed from a fixed moral disposition.

            = Hence, acts are called virtuous when they are the kind of acts a virtuous person would perform, but a person who performs a virtuous act is not necessarily (he)rself virtuous.  The virtuous person is one who performs that act in the way common to virtuous persons, that is, s(he) knows that the act is the right thing to do in the circumstances, and s(he)does it for the right motive.

The human soul is conditioned by three factors: (a) emotions or feelings, capacities and dispositions or characteristics.  It is evident that virtue must be one of these.  Emotions include such things as anger, appetite, fear, confidence, envy, pity and other state of mind that involves pleasure or pain. Capacities are our faculties for experiencing emotions.  Dispositions are the conditions or states of character in which we are in regard to emotions (e.g., we say that one has a bad disposition where anger is concerned if he tends to become excessively or insufficiently angry and has a good disposition toward anger if he consistently feels the appropriate amount of anger).

Virtue or excellence is something for which persons are called good or bad or for which they are praised or blamed.  Since one is not called good or bad on the basis of his emotions, it is clear that virtue is not an emotion.  Furthermore, virtues are the result of some kind of choice but a man does not exercise his will (i.e., make a choice) when he experiences such emotions as anger or fear.  It is also clear that virtue is not capacity, since a person is not praised or blamed for having the ability to experience certain feelings.  A human being receives (he)r capacities from nature, but nature does not cause (he)r to develop into a good or a bad man.  Therefore, since virtues and vices are not emotions or capacities, they must belong to the genus known as dispositions or characteristics.

Virtue in a person is whatever characteristic that makes (he)r a good man and causes (he)r to perform (he)r function well.

Any continuous activity (including feeling and action, the raw materials of virtue) is divisible into parts.  These may include a LARGER PART, a SMALLER PART, and the HALF OR EQUAL PART, which can be defined as the MEAN between too much and too little.  In things which do not vary there is an objective mean which is always the same (e.g., the mean between two points ten miles apart is always five miles).

The mean is relative in such things as the feelings and actions of persons.  This is because there are differences between people in regard to most characteristics and attributes (e.g., ten pounds of food may be too much for a person and two pounds not enough, but this does not necessarily imply that six pounds is the right amount for a person or for all men).

Moral virtue aims at the relative mean in feeling and action.  Moral virtue can be defined as a disposition to choose the mean relative to oneself, as determined by a rational principle (i.e., by the rational principle that would be applied by a person with practical wisdom and common sense).

It is possible to experience too much or too little of any emotion, and in either case the emotion is not experienced properly.  The mark of virtue is to experience an emotion at the right time, toward the right objects or person, for the right reason, and in the right manner; in other words, in accordance with the mean.  This principle applies to the evaluation of all human actions.  Excess, mean and deficiency can be determined for all feelings and action.

What then is Excellence or Virtue?
            = Aristotle puts in that excellence is a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on the intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine it.  And it is intermediacy between two bad states, one involving excess, and the other involving deficiency; and also because one set of bad states is deficient, the other excessive in relation to what is required both in affections and in actions, whereas excellence both finds and chooses the intermediate.

A shown by Aristotle, there are three kinds of dispositions.  Two are vicious (one characterized by excess, the other by deficiency), and one is virtuous (the mean).

How to Find the Mean?  The following points have been established:

1.      Moral virtue is a mean.
2.      It is a mean between two vices, one marked by excess and the other by deficiency.
3.      It is a mean in the sense that it aims at the middle point in emotions and actions.

Here are some rules for the guidance of those who seek the mean (i.e., who seek after virtue):

1.      Avoid the extreme most opposed to the mean for which you are seeking. One of the two extremes is always more in error than the other. If you must err from the right path, it is better to choose the lesser of two evils.

2.      Guard against those errors into which you are most likely to fall because of your natural inclinations by forcing yourself to move in the opposite direction. One can determine his natural inclinations by observing the amount of pleasure and pain he experiences in regard to certain things.

3.      Remember that you will make few mistakes if you try to avoid pleasure and pleasant things and move away from whatever is most tempting for this will tend to be the path toward the mean.



FEELING
ACTION
EXCESS
MEAN
DEFICIENCY
Fear

Cowardice
Courage
Unnamed
Confidence

Recklessness (overconfidence)

Self-indulgence (intemperance)
Courage


Self-control
(temperance)
Cowardice


“insensitivity”
(word in this context coined by Aristotle)
Sensual pleasures (note that pain may arise from the desire for such pleasures)




Giving of money

Taking of money

Giving of money on a large scale (as for charity or public use)

Pursuit of honor on a large scale

Pursuit of honor on a small scale





Extravagance

Stinginess

Vulgarity




Vanity


Ambitiousness





Generosity

Generosity

Magnificence




Highmindedness


Unnamed, could be called ambition in proper amount





Stinginess

Prodigality

Meanness




Smallmindedness


Unambitiousness


Anger













Telling the truth about oneself

Pleasantness in amusement

Pleasantness in daily life
Shorttemperedness

Boastfulness


Buffoonery


Obsequiousness





Gentleness

Truthfulness


Wittiness


Friendliness





Apathy

Self-depreciation


Boorishness


Grouchiness
Shame

Bashfulness

Modesty

Shamelessness

Pain and pleasure felt at good or bad fortune of others

Envy
Righteous indignation
Spite




An important point worth noting is that Aristotle’s mean is not a rigid mathematical abstraction, since he points out several times that it is a “mean relative to us,” and differs fro people of different dispositions or in different circumstances.  Although his doctrine of the mean is stated abstractly, Aristotle was well aware that goodness and moral conduct cannot be reduced to artificial formulas or rules.
From Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics"....THE GOLDEN MEAN (THE MEDIAN PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY)
ARISTOTLE On Man In the Universe, Edited with introduction by Louise Romes Loomis, Published for the Classic Club by Walter J. Black, Inc: Roslyn, New York.

Saturday, August 17, 2013

GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

THE DISCUSSION BELOW CAME FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THROUGH WHICH I AM INDEBTED; NONETHELESS, THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWS IS PRIMARILY BASED ON THE MAIN TEXT OF THE SCHOLAR IMMANUEL KANT'S "GROUNDWORK OF THE  METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (GERMAN: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)"
   
taken from the the social networking site FACEBOOK

          A person who fruitfully resists the temptation of desire has willpower ( willpower means  a combination of determination and self-discipline that enables somebody to do something despite the difficulties involved) while the individual who gives in and acts to satisfy the desire does not have willpower.

          This concept of willpower brings to mind the following model of human action: The agent begins with a group of beliefs and desires that are motives or reasons to action.  Motives to action are like forces that get the body into action.  The agent, however, must (or at least should) evaluate the desires to determine whether they should or shouldn’t be satisfied.  The agent’s reason acts as the evaluator.  When reason acts as evaluator, reason is also considered governor, because it is the last thing that determines the will (will means  the part of the mind with which somebody consciously decides things; the use of the mind to make decisions about things; the determination to do something or a desire or inclination to do something), which in turn determines action. Before a particular desire can be acted on by the agent, the act of willing to attempt to satisfy the desire must first exist.   The agent needs needs to choose or decide to either act or not act on the desire. Only then does the body act.  Hence, we could imagine human action schematically in the following manner:

              Beliefs + desires → evaluation of reason → Act of will to satisfy desire (decision)
 → Action to satisfy desire.

          In any event that reason is not acting as evaluator, the model turns into something like this:

                 Beliefs + desires → Act of will to satisfy desire (decision)  → Action to satisfy desire.

          Immanuel Kant acknowledged that desires often conflict. There are instances that acting to satisfy one desire will ensure that we cannot satisfy another desire. Let us say for example that you have the desire to go out with friends this coming Saturday to dance and party.  Satisfying now this desire would mean sacrificing your other desire to jump to bed early and maximize the highly recommended hours of sleep of 7 to 8 hours a day.  Take again for example the given situation, you have the desire to play DOTA or to have an EB with someone else you have been chatting lately over the net after your class this afternoon; however, you also have the desire to read something about Immanuel Kant’s life so that you will not be getting a failing score in your quiz in this subject next meeting.  In such instances where we have with us conflicting desires, we must decide which desire to satisfy.

          As rational individuals, it is expected on our part that we have to let our reason decide between conflicting desires (but sometimes, as individuals with organic or earthly bodies with organic or earthly desires and needs, we oftentimes find ourselves consumed in satisfying our base desires. I am not saying this as an excuse but we should at least now how to master our desires as rational individuals…I hope you still remember “the mark of virtue” of Aristotle).  No particular action will be done until our will has been activated.  Hence, our will is considered to be the master of our actions.  According to Immanuel Kant, if we are rational, then our will must not be the slave of our desires by merely doing the request or command of our desires.  Our will instead can cooperate with our reason to master whatever desires we have.

        The only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is a good will. A good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense is an absolute good or unconditioned good.  The goodness of a good will is not derived from the goodness of the results which it produces.  A good will continues to have its own uniqueness goodness even where, by some misfortune, it is unable to produce the results at which it aims. As Kant would say in the Groundwork, “it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself” (see your reading for further emphasis on this point of Kant on the good will and its result).

        In going further with his discussion on the good will, Kant in the Groundwork tried to discuss the function of reason.  According to Kant, reason has been imparted to us as a practical power─that is, as one which is to have influence on the will; the true function of reason must be to produce a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself….(see your reading for further emphasis on this point of Kant on the function of reason).  For Kant, reason in action has for him two main functions, the first of which has to be subordinated to the second.  The first function is to secure the individual’s own happiness (a conditioned good), while the second is to manifest a will that is good in itself.

        However, despite these discussions made by Kant, a question comes to mind─that is, if one thing that is good without qualifications is a good will, then what makes will good and what makes it bad?

Kant was a supporter of what we have called commonsense morality. He thought that the moral views common to most people are pretty much correct. Therefore, he would think that a person with a good will would not commit major moral offenses such as murder or robbery, would not commit minor moral offenses such as maliciously gossiping about people, and would help people in need.

        Kant took these things for granted. But he recognized that a person might have a good will and not to be able to actually do any of the things a good person would do, or refrain from doing the things a good person would not do, similarly, someone might do all the things that a good person would do and refrain from doing all the things that a good person would not do, and yet not have a good will. For example, someone may contribute to charity only because it’s in his self-interest, perhaps a politician who believes that he will gain votes by (publicly) contributing to charity. Kant does not think that his contributing money shows that he has a good will.

        What about performing actions that normally would be considered an indication that someone lacks a good will? Suppose someone acts n a way that is deeply offensive or insulting to someone else. Would that necessarily show that he or she lacks a good will? No- not if he or she did not intent to offensive or insulting.

        Kant points out that we cannot tell whether someone has a good will by looking only at what that person does or does not do, or only at the effects or consequences of his actions. One’s intentions are the key to whether one has good will. It is what one wants to accomplish – what one wills – that counts (for the Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, it is the consequence of the act that counts while for Immanuel Kant, it is not the consequence of the act that counts but the intention of the person doing the act). A person has a good will if he or she tires to do what is right and tries to avoid doing what is wrong. But the trying must be a genuine trying a summoning of all one’s capacities to work hard toward doing what is right and to refrain from doing what’s wrong (if by this time you now have in mind this question of what is right and what is wrong, then such question will be answered as we proceed with our discussion).

        Kant says that the concept of duty contains the concepts of a good will but it probably would be more accurate to say that the concept of a good will entails the concept of duty (a duty is an obligation of behavior or conduct in relation to others or even to God which has a stronger claim on a person than (he)r self-interest). One has a good will if one tries to do one’s duty. But Kant emphasized that for a will to be truly good, it must try to do its duty from purely moral motive, rather than from a self-interested movie. The purely moral motive is the desire to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law. A person with a good will respects the moral law and tries to act dutifully because he or she desires to act in ways that conform to what (he)r duties are.

        In introducing the concept of duty, Kant came up with 3 propositions about morality rooted on duty: (1) A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination─still less because it is done from self-interest─but because it is done fro the sake of duty (Consider the implication of this situation, what if for example in this particular room at around 7 pm in the evening, I saw you desperately in need for immediate medical attention but then the problem is I am not disposed this time to help; likewise, I have a business deal to attend to at 7:15 pm to have this 4 million pesos account deal to be safely deposited to my account.); (2) An action done from duty has moral worth, not from the results  it attains or seeks to attain, but from a formal principle or maxim─the principle of doing one’s duty whatever that duty may be (This simply re-states the first proposition in a more technical way.  We  have already seen that a good will cannot derive its unconditioned goodness from the conditioned goodness of the results at which it aims, and this is true also of the morally good actions in which a good will acting for the sake of duty is manifested.); (3) Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law (What is this law? This law speaks a a law which is valid for all rational beings as such independently of their particular desires. This law is better understood with the Categorical Imperative of Kant as a test of maxim by helping us evaluate whether or not a maxim is possible to become a universal law.).

ACTIONS AND MAXIMS

Kant believed that people acts as they do for the reason (whether or not they are immediately conscious of the reason or engage in deliberation before acting). For example, suppose that Marc and Andrew each contribute PHP 100,000 to charity. According to Kant, each has a reason for his or her action. Let’s assume that we know their reasons. Marc approves of the goals of the charity and wants to help in accomplishing its goals.  Andrew knows that the names of large contributors will be publicized; he wants to impress his business associates and customers, which he thinks will improve his business.

Kant believed that when people act for a reason, they’re following a maxim – a kind of personal rule of action. Of course, people do not always consciously formulate maximum and then deliberately follow them. Rather, people often act as though they formulate and follow maxims. However, Kant seemed to assume that we can discover what maxim will follow, even if we did not consciously formulate and follow it. Given Marc and Andrew's reasons for contributing to charity, we might express the maxims they were following as M1 (Marc’s Maxim) and M2 (Adrew’s maxim.)

M1. I will contribute to charity when I approved of the Charity’s goal, and I want to help it achieve its purpose.
M2. I will contribute to charity when I think that doing so will help improve my business and I want to improve my business.

A maxim takes the form “I will do action X in circumstances C for purpose P.” It is a personal principal of action, a kind of prescription of how a person will act in certain circumstances to achieve what he or she wants. Thus, a maxim must specify: (1) what I will do, (2) the concrete circumstances in which I will do it, and (3) why I will do it.

According to Kant, an action done from duty has moral worth based only on the maxim that the agent follows, which specified the action, the circumstances and the motive. But surely an action cannot have moral worth if the agent is following a bad maxim, such as “I will kill people whenever it is advantageous to me.” Presumably an action has moral worth if and only if the maxim being followed is a morally acceptable maxim. But what makes a maxim morally acceptable or morally unacceptable?

Before turning to this question, however, let us reflect a bit more on the maxims and behavior of Marc and Andrew. Did Marc or Andrew do anything wrong in contributing to charity? If they were following morally unacceptable maxims, then they were doing something wrong, but if they were following morally acceptable maxims, they were not doing anything wrong. Whether they did anything wrong, then it all depends on whether their maxims are morally acceptable. Surely neither did anything wrong. However, Kant would say that Andrew’s action lacked moral worth because the maxim he followed was purely self-interested. (Lacking moral worth, their actions do not merit praise; but it does not follow that because they lack moral worth, they merit condemnation instead) so once again, we face the task of distinguishing between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable maxims.

Thus, whether we are talking about the moral worth of actions or the rightness and wrongness of actions, we need to distinguish between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable maxims. We require a test of maxims that will enable us to distinguish between those that are and those that are not morally acceptable to act on.

Kant did not think that we need to invent a totally new test to determine the rightness and wrongness of maxims. He believed that there is a test that most ordinary people apply and that has been endorsed by most of the world’s major religions, including Christianity.  This test is the so-called Golden Rule: Treat people the way you want to be treated. However, he did think that the Gold Rule needed to be made more precise in order to be applied correctly. He called his reformulation of the Golden Rule the Categorical Imperative. It’s an imperative because it takes the form of a rule. It’s categorical because it applies in all circumstances, regardless of an agents’ desires and because it binds all rational agents.



5 FORMULATIONS OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE:

(1) The Formula of Universality  or the Principle of Universal Law  

"Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should be come a universal law."

(2) The Formula of the Law of Nature

"Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will as a universal law of nature without contradiction."

(3) The Respect for People Formulation or The Principle of an End in Itself

"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end."

(4) The Formula on Autonomy or The Principle of Freedom (Freedom of Will as Rational Agents)

"So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim."

(5) The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends

"So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends."


Can your maxim be universalized without contradiction?
Can your maxim show respect to yourself as a person and to other persons as well?
If your answer is NO, then your maxim cannot become a moral law.
In the application of the rule on contradiction, you have to consider if in the process  your happiness or your own survival or existence  or humanity's survival would be at sake or compromised. At this point, it is important to point out that for Immanuel Kant, committing suicide to escape the challenges and sufferings in life is not morally acceptable because this maxim can never be universalized without contradiction aside from the fact that committing suicide will not also show respect to oneself as a person since the self is sacrificed to achieve an end which is to run away from those challenges and sufferings.

Take note that in the kingdom or in the World of Ends, one has either a price or a dignity or intrinsic value or unconditioned value. If it has a price, then something else can be put in its place as equivalent. If it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity.

Autonomy or Freedom is the ground or the cornerstone of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. Dignity must be viewed as the result of people who are free and autonomous moral and rational agents mutually respecting each other.  

Ang paggamit ng kapwa natin tao ay hindi tahasan at agad-agarang masama. Kailangan nating alamin kung ano ang pamamaraan at kung paano natin gagamitin ang iba. Do you just treat the other  person  as a thing? Hipocrito ang taong magsasabing hindi ako nanggamit at hindi ako mangagamit ng iba. No one will ever continue living/surviving without (he)r using others or being used in return. We all live in communities and societies where we all are functionally related to one another because of necessity. Hindi lahat ng pangangailangan mo ay kaya mong ibigay sa iyong sarili.

taken from the the social networking site FACEBOOK