THE HUMAN PERSON: AN EMBODIED SUBJECTIVITY IN ITS
“KABUUAN”
by: Atty. Mark Gil Jerez Ramolete, MA Philos
The human person as a dasein (a
there-being) is described and pictured in an existential perspective as a
being-in-the-world-with-the-Others. The hyphens in between the words emphasize
the most basic and primordial fact that our worldly life is a form of existence
that is neither isolated nor disengaged in nature. Our existence in this
world is not simply limited nor confined to our own private and personal
lives. My existence as well as your existence is connected with the
world as well as with the others.
You might now be asking on
what drives me to come up with this claim? At this point of our
discussion, it is now necessary that we first come up with a descriptive view
of what do we mean when we speak of the human body and at the same time the
human person’s subjectivity. Speaking of body, we refer here to the
embodiment of one’s subjectivity and consciousness, including also one’s
sexuality. The body as the one who is the seat of needs and
appetites, as the locus of physiological processes and metabolisms, as the
target of attacks of germs and viruses. Furthermore, we could speak of the body
as the biological base of our human existence or our inter-subjective and
social existence. Likewise, the body refers to the overall physical
form of the human person. William Luijpen and Henry Koren share the same
view on the presented description of the body when they assert:
My body lies on
the side of the subject who I am but, at the same time, involves me and
signifies my standpoint in it. When my body disintegrates, my world also
“goes to pieces,” and the complete dissolution of my body means a break with
the world, the end also of my being as a conscious-being-in-the-world, the end
of my being-human (p. 36).
The body, therefore, is considered as the all
embracing material or corporeal structure of the human person. It is from
this regard that my body and your body that set forth the limits and boundaries
of our human existence. The corporeality of our bodies allows us
also in return to experience the corporeality of the world. Thus,
we all need to protect and to care for our bodies because without our bodies
that embody our subjectivities, there would be no other means for us to be
mediated with our fellow human beings and with the corporeality of the world.
Furthermore, our connectedness with the world and
with the others is not only possible through our bodies alone, but also
includes the indispensable role assumed by our subjectivities vis-à-vis to our
human existence. By subjectivity, we mean to refer here with the
person’s interiority as a subject that serves as the locus or matrix where one
can take control of himself/herself, most especially in the constitution and
the generation of meaning and depth towards one’s temporal existence in this
corporeal and material world. Thus, without this subjectivity in a
person, all the actions of the person will become mechanical or robotic
actions. As Luijpen and Koren elaborate:
Subjectivity is
the aspect of the human person’s reality by virtue of which he/she rises above
being the blindly determined result of processes and forces (p. 101).
The human person is not completely shaped by
biological processes and by sociological processes. However, the
statement should not be interpreted as saying that we are not anymore shaped by
the constraints imposed to us by biological processes and sociological process.
Both processes have an effect and at the same time influence on who we
are and on what we are as subjects. But my subjectivity and your
own subjectivity allow both of us to transcend or move beyond the blind
determination of these processes. As a human person, who we are and what we
are is that which we create from what we have and from where we are as a being
endowed with subjectivity.
At this point of our discussion, we can now say
that human existence and co-existence are possible since the human person is
not just simply a being with a body but also a being with subjectivity.
The human person, therefore, is an embodied subjectivity. As embodied
subjectivities, each person is a being doomed with a lot of potentials and
capabilities to actualize. It is when these potentials and
capabilities are actualized that a person is enabled to fully understand
her(him)self not only as a body but also as a being with
subjectivity. Having a lot of potentials and capabilities to
actualize, specifically that potential to give depth and meaning to human existence,
makes the human person primordially a subject. This is an ontological
fact that we cannot just deny to ourselves as beings existing in a community of
beings.
You might ask on what drives me to come up with
this claim that the human person is primordially a subject? Of all
beings in this world, it is only the human person who is capable of generating
and initiating meanings in this life. When for example you kick one of the
pillars of a wooden table or chair, slap the face or punch any part of the body
of a human size stuffed toy, the table, the chair and the stuffed toy would
certainly not mind what happened. The table, the chair or the
stuffed toy would not certainly show any manifestations of hurt feelings or
emotions. However, if the same act would be done to a person, then
the person as a giving-meaning existent subject would certainly show
manifestations of hurt feelings or emotions. Probably, if the
person is still experiencing a reasoned emotion immediately after the incident,
then the person would be asking you some questions why such act has been made
to her/him; otherwise, the person would have already kicked you in the ass or
might have already slapped or punched you in the face or any part of your
body. Another one for example is when you kick the ass of your
sleeping dog or cat in the mat. If the dog or cat is quite
submissive or subservient to you as the master or probably trained in a culture
of “blind obedience,” then the dog or cat would have immediately run away out
of fright; otherwise, the dog or cat would have immediately bite you in the leg
or any part of your body.
While brute animals are capable of experiencing
pain, unlike the table, chair and stuffed toy, brute animals are not capable of
giving meaning to their experience of pain, unlike the human being as a giving
meaning-existent subject. As embodied subjectivities, we are
capable of experiencing pain just like those brute animals since we have with
us corporeal bodies that enable us to feel pain. However, as
embodied subjectivities, we are not merely capable of experiencing pain because
of our bodies. We are also capable of giving meaning to our pain because
we also have with us our subjectivities as an indispensable or integral part of
our totality or “kabuuan” that empower us to accord meaning to our pain.
Following the anthropological-existential view that the human person is
fundamentally the center, the source of depth and initiative in the cosmos, the
human person therefore is primordially a subject. As the source of depth,
meaning and initiative in the cosmos, we are differentiated from other beings
in the world. We are specifically differentiated from most beings
in this world, in as much as we are not similar with brute animals, things,
objects and stuffs. As an unfinished project, a project still in
progress, the human person is constantly in the process of becoming as a
subject-being. Thus, as embodied subjectivities, we have to continuously give
and generate assertive meanings in our day to day existence in our encounter
with the others around us.
Indeed, the human person in its totality or
“kabuuan” is an embodied subjectivity. From this standpoint, we can
now say that human encounters are possible because we are embodied
subjectivities in our “kabuuan.” I see and encounter you as a
person like me in the world because you are not only a body nor a mere
subjectivity, but an embodied subjectivity like me in your
totality. Likewise, you see and encounter me as a person like you
in the world because I am not only a body nor a mere subjectivity, but an
embodied subjectivity like you in my totality. Body and
subjectivity constitute a unified whole in every human beings.
Nonetheless, this does not mean to say the body and subjectivity are the
same. Body and subjectivity are distinct from each other but not
separate since they constitute a unified whole. Body and subjectivity
are different from each other, but not separate since they constitute a unified
whole in our totality or “kabuuan” as persons.
We have to constantly remember that my “kabuuan,”
your “kabuuan,” our “kabuuan” as embodied subjectivities cannot be reduced nor
be relegated to the attributes that we have by virtue of our corporeal body
through its immersion in a particular space and time. We are not
just our body parts. We are not simply limited to what we have as
attributes. We are more than the attributes that we
have. We are as human beings in our totality or in our
“kabuuan.”
Any attempt to reduce our
totality or our “kabuuan” as embodied subjectivities to our bodily parts or
attributes would mean reducing who we are to these bodily parts and
attributes. If we reduce our “kabuuan” to our bodily parts or
attributes, then we are now in this case our butt, eyes, genitalia, hairs,
legs, breasts, eyebrows, etc. Such absurd and ridiculous consequent would arise
provided that we reduce who we are or our “kabuuan” to our bodily parts or
attributes. While our bodily parts or attributes are deemed important and
significant aspects of who we are as embodied subjectivities, they are distinct
from our “kabuuan” or totality. Though our bodily parts or attributes
constitute a unified whole with our “kabuuan” as embodied subjectivities, we
cannot just simply say that we are our bodily parts or attributes without
qualification; otherwise, we could now be walking or even talking penises,
vaginas, butts, breasts, hairs, etc. Thus, we should say instead
that we are persons in our “kabuuan,” and from these “kabuuan” of ours we have
with us certain bodily parts and attributes that differentiate us from one
another as embodied subjectivities.
At this point of our
discussion, I do not want to be interpreted as saying that our bodily parts or
attributes are already insignificant. They are significant in as much as they
constitute an indispensable role in our “kabuuan” or totality as embodied
subjectivities. I came up with this assertion because of the observation
of mine on how certain magazines, newspapers, advertisements and even in the
conversations of people give so much interest and attention on bodily parts or
attributes. Most of the time we usually read, hear and see some explicit
and implicit “pedagogical” materials instructing and encouraging people how to
have a nice butt, breasts, abs, chest, face, etc., or to have a fair skin, or
to have a stunning and superb body in general. I have no immediate
problem with the way bodily parts or attributes are accorded the fitting
attention that they deserve. As embodied subjectivities, we are beings who both
desire and being desired upon; thus, the need to accord the necessary attention
to these bodily parts or attributes of ours. However, the problem arises
when these bodily parts or attributes are given too much attention or overflowing
interest and concern as compared to the totality of the person who possesses
them. Once in a while we need to feel good and look about ourselves, but
should we just feel good and look good from the outside? This is now the
question that all of us must struggle to ponder about, including me because
sometimes I am usually inclined to give more interest and attention to my
bodily parts or attributes because of the inescapable gaze of the others.
Because of the increasing
trend in fashion, in advertising and the deeply embedded influence of phallic
discourses in the cultural domain, more and more people are being shaped,
conditioned and encouraged to give more emphasis and attention to what we have
as bodily parts or attributes. This observation is evident in the way
some women responded to the use of silicone just to increase the size of their
breasts. Likewise, some men have even gone to the point of using steroids
just to induce muscle mass on their chests, abs, shoulders, biceps, triceps,
etc. Furthermore, sometimes instead of praising and valuing individuals in
their totality as persons, some of us have paid too much attention on the worth
of the person on what they have as bodily parts or attributes. All these
circumstances and other analogous circumstances simply show how some of us have
shown the ardent desire and inclination to focus more on what we have as bodily
parts or attributes just to feel good and look good. All these circumstances
and other similar circumstances have made some of us to shift our paradigm of
care from our “kabuuan” or totality as persons to what we have as bodily parts
or attributes.
The mere care for our
bodily parts or attributes would be an incomplete and an inadequate form of
ethos of care for the self if such form of care is simply limited and confined
to these bodily parts or attributes alone. The care for these bodily
parts or attributes of ours would not suffice if we would not accord the
necessary care to our “kabuuan” as embodied subjectivities. It would not
suffice to feel good and look good only from the outside besides we are not
just simply beings with external features. If we simply limit the desire
to feel good and look good from the outside, then this form of restriction can
potentially lead to the constitution of a “false consciousness” among certain
affected individuals by basing and looking at their self-worth through those
bodily parts or attributes that they have. We also need to feel
good and look good from the inside not only from the outside since we also have
with us internal features that complement our external features forming our
“kabuuan” or our totality as beings who both desire and being desired
upon. Thus, we could start in our own personal or communal way of developing
an ethos of care for the self anchored on the need to care for our “kabuuan” as
persons and not simply our bodily parts or attributes. We could start
this ethos of care for the self by renewing and rekindling the worth and value
that our “kabuuan” deserves. To do this, we shouldn’t just be paying too
much attention to these bodily parts or attributes of ours. These
bodily parts or attributes of ours should not just simply be the basis of our
self worth as persons. Our self-worth as persons must and should go
beyond these bodily part or attributes of ours. We should not just
simply be confined and imprisoned by the inescapable gaze of the others for us
to feel good and look good. Likewise, we should always see the
connectedness and the significance of these bodily parts or attributes of ours
to our “kabuuan” as embodied subjectivities who both desire and being desired
upon.
This work is a
portion of the author’s thesis in MA Philos entitled, A Feminist
Discourse on Sexuality and the Reality of a Repressed Sexuality towards a
Valorized “Kabuuan,” (Baguio City: Saint Louis University, March
2007).
Martin
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996).
William Luijpen
and Henry Koren, A First Introduction to Existential Phenomenology,
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
